UIC Law Review
Volume 32

Issue 3

Article 2

Spring 1999

Federal Circuit's Forgotten Lessons: Annealing New Forms of
Intellectual Property through Consolidated Appellate Jurisdiction,
32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 581 (1999)
Chris J. Katopis

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Courts Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Jurisdiction
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Chris J. Katopis, Federal Circuit's Forgotten Lessons: Annealing New Forms of Intellectual Property
through Consolidated Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 581 (1999)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S FORGOTTEN
LESSONS?: ANNEALING NEW FORMS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THROUGH
CONSOLIDATED APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
CHRIS J. KATOPIS*
The landmark case of Marbury v. Madison teaches us among
its lessons that the hallmark of a strong legal right is the
guarantee of an effective corresponding remedy.' The nature and
structure of the dispute resolution forum affect the disposition of
an asserted right and shape the remedy. Policymakers serve the
public interest when they review the role of the courts in our legal
system. The many issues in question, for example, caseload,
jurisdiction and federalism, all play a role for anyone who tries
exercising rights as the laws were envisioned.!
Many
commentators wisely remind us that everyone should have the

* 1994, J.D., Temple University; 1990, B.S., University of Pennsylvania.
The author is rumored to be the only patent attorney ever to work for a
Member of Congress. Very special thanks go to the Honorable Pauline
Newman for generously reading this article, the Honorable Glenn L. Archer,
Jr., for his comments on this topic, and Mr. Michael J. Remington of the
Washington law firm of Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP, and former House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice, Chief Counsel, whose help and insightful comments
regarding the history of many of the cited statutes were invaluable in the
transmutation of this article. Additional thanks go to my favorite legal
scholar, my brother, Theodore John.
The author, however, is solely
responsible for any of the following views, content or possible errors.
1. "If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy? The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of laws,
whenever he receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
162-63 (1803) (establishing judicial review, yet this historic case is at its heart
primarily concerning jurisdiction of the federal courts). "A patent without a
meaningful remedy against infringement is like no patent at all." 142 CONG.
REC. S11845 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (letter of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, urging colleagues to oppose the
enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) relating to remedies for medical procedure
patents).
2. Judge Posner notes that caseload crisis in the federal courts is greatest
in the appellate court system. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 244 (1996).
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benefit of laws that are understandable, uniform, reliable and
consistent with the intent of the lawmakers.3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(the Federal Circuit) is a unique institution in the United States
legal system for two reasons." First, it is unique because of its
structure-a consolidated or unified appellate forum with a
national jurisdiction, unlike the regional federal courts of appeals.'
Second, it is unique because its national jurisdiction results in an
annealing, or an increased uniformity, within the bodies of law it
reviews. Uniformity is a positive jurisprudential principle and a
practical asset that increases certainty and minimizes waste.
Today, the Federal Circuit is credited with improving the law
within its jurisdiction.7 A worthy question for policymakers is
whether the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction should be expanded in
an attempt to improve additional bodies of law.'
This Article considers the public policy advantages of
expanding the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to include new forms
of intellectual property law. Part I begins with an overview of
intellectual property law. Part I also discusses the value of
uniformity within a legal system by looking at history and theory
behind intellectual property law. Part II discusses the history of
the Federal Circuit and evaluates the advantages and
disadvantages of a national court of appeals. Part III explains
that both new and old intellectual property laws benefit from the
exclusive appellate review of a consolidated appellate forum. Part
IV gives advice to Congress for expanding the court's jurisdiction.
Finally, a few words of conclusion are offered to help guide future
policymakers who address this issue.
3. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO PUB. L. NO. 105-119, at ix (Dec. 18, 1998)
[hereinafter COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT].
4. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 1982

U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 25.
5."The geographic circuit is an ancient concept of judicial administration,
imported to this country from England as a means of getting more work from
judges by having them hold court throughout a region." REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 113 (1990).

6. See Frank M. Gasparo, Markham v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Its
Procedural Shock Wave: The Markham Hearing, 5 J.L. & POLY 723, 739-40
(1979) (noting the importance of uniformity in the federal courts). See also
Markham v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996) (citing
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)
(explaining types of waste avoided through uniformity)).
7. See infra note 93.

8. Recently, this very question was raised by members of the federal
judiciary and the bar in the course of the 1998 analysis of the regional courts
of appeals. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 72-73.
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I.

FederalCircuit's ForgottenLessons?

THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGAL SYSTEM PRIMARILY
GUARANTEES ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND IS STRENGTHENED BY
UNIFORMITY OF THE LAW

The historical and philosophical underpinnings of intellectual
property show that its purpose is to provide a narrowly-tailored,
private monopoly privilege as an incentive to produce various
types of works for the public good.9 In the United States,
intellectual property rights comprise a combination of state and
federal legal protection for a variety of works. These include
patents (e.g., useful inventions and processes), copyrights (e.g.,
creative expression), trademarks (e.g., commercial logos), trade
secrets (e.g., proprietary information), semiconductor mask works' °
(i.e., computer chip technology), and the rights of publicity and
privacy (e.g., famous personae)."
The United States Constitution, through the Patent and
Copyright Clause, vests Congress with authority in this area,
although the clause is not self-executing." Congress is responsible
for creating federal protective devices, such as enacting
intellectual property statutes. Patents are entirely a creature of
federal statute.' There is no common law of patents.'4 Likewise,
Congress has the power to change these laws at its pleasure." The
9. Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual
Property:From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 171
(1997); Ryan J. Swingle, Tanisi v. N.Y Times: The Problem of Unauthorized
Secondary Usage of an Author's Works, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 601, 620 (1998).
10. A mask work is defined under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
as:
a series of related images, however fixed or encoded-(A) having or
representing the predetermined, three dimensional pattern of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material present or removed from the
layers of a semiconductor chip product; and (B) in which series the
relation of the images to one another is that each image has the pattern
of the surface of one form of the semiconductor chip product.
17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (1998).
11. The dictionary definition reads, "[t]he right of an individual, especially
a public figure or celebrity, to control commercial value and exploitation of his
name or picture or likeness or to prevent others from unfairly appropriating
that value for their commercial benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1325 (6th
ed. 1990).
12. The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (8 Pet.) 658 (1834). "Patent property is
the creature of [federal] statute law and [the] incidents [of that property]
depend upon [those patent] statutes." Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool &
Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 40 (1923). The first patent statute was enacted in
1790. Pub. L. No. 99-523, 100 Stat. 3002 (1986).
14. In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Markey, C.J.,
concurring).
15. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843) (concerning
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Supreme Court has upheld Congress' federal supremacy in this
sphere." For these reasons, all legislative activity pertaining to
intellectual property-including hearings, floor activity, and new
statutes-is particularly worthy of careful attention.
Federal intellectual property laws primarily guarantee
economic rights. 7 The intellectual property protection available
on the state level acknowledges non-economic rights. 8 Moreover,
trade secrets and misappropriation law, primarily areas of state
law, seek to protect general societal, ethical and equitable
principles such as fair play and good faith.19 Non-economic rights
are creative incentives within their own right, although they are
not guaranteed by the bulk of federal law.' °
Any argument to modify a court's jurisdiction must include a
sound and persuasive analysis that is based on discrete and
concrete criteria. Federal intellectual property policy primarily
acknowledges economic rights that are considered morally neutral.
Thus, any analysis or debate concerning the law's jurisdictional
patents).
16. See cases cited infra note 39.
17. The major exception in current federal law is moral rights and the
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990). Generally moral rights are principal among non-economic rights.
See The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1989; Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
[hereinafter VARA Hearings] ") (statement of Professor Jane C. Ginsburg)
(indicating "[mioral rights claims go to creators' reputation, not to rights of
economic exploitation). "In France, droit moral [or moral rights] encompasses
four distinct rights: the rights of disclosure [deciding whether and when the
work is made public], attribution, integrity [the preservation of the work from
any alteration or mutilation], and withdrawal [the right of an author to
reclaim or modify her work whenever it no longer accurately represents his
personality]. The Berne Convention requires member countries to protect only
the rights of attribution and integrity." BUSINESS TORTS § 29-297 (Joseph D.
Zamore, et al. eds., 1998). See also Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1734
(1984) (stating that "[flrom the time of its creation, the artwork continuously
embodies the creative personality of the author; consequently, the transfer of
the material object-or the economic rights-is irrelevant to the existence of
[moral] rights"); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality:A Common-Law
Basis for the Protectionof the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988).
18. A number of states have enacted some type of moral rights laws to
protect the creative rights of artists. New York and California are considered
having the model laws. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.09 nn. 2-8 (1997)
(noting that Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico and Rhode Island have enacted "moral rights" laws).
19. Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits of Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal
Patentand Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1432 (1967).
20. "The theory of moral rights [teaches us] that they result in a climate of
artistic worth and honor that encourages the author in the arduous act of
creation." VARA Hearings, supra note 17 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register
of Copyrights).
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aspects is justifiably limited to economic and practical factors,
rather than esoteric and non-quantifiable issues (e.g., the scope of
the moral right of reputation in copyright). The relevant economic
factors include production volume, cost, and certainty.
The economics of artistry abhor uncertainty, just as all
industrial activity abhors uncertainty. In the business realm, this
activity refers to the initiation, operation and harvesting of an
investment.
The same proposition equally applies to the
economics underlying the innovative processes used in the
furtherance of other types of intellectual property. One safely
concludes, after jointly reading these propositions, that strong
intellectual property rights require certainty regarding their
corresponding legal remedies.
A.

The Economics of Uniformity and Uncertainty

Congress' policy decisions-both affirmative choices and
abstentions-guarantee
worldwide
economic
consequences.
Today, the breadth and dynamism of the global economy present a
fierce competition for resources. Factors such as the mobility of
capital mean that industry and investors face increasingly difficult
choices as to how best devote any unit of resources, whether it is a
single dollar or one hour of toil. 1 At one time the choice might
have been very simple-whether to put one's money into the
proverbial mattress. This traditional choice is now supplemented
by many sophisticated investment options, including investing in a
product or firm, the mutual fund market or a wide array of other
financial devices.
As new economic rights, such as intellectual property rights,
are established, the choices for investing resources for their most
productive use multiply.
For individuals and firms, the
marketplace consequence posed by any new right is the creation of
a new choice: where to invest? The question is whether one should
place resources into works secured by the traditional creative
outlets (such as those secured by patents and copyrights) or the
activities secured by the new rights (such as database
compilation). This resource allocation dilemma is especially true
when the choices are mutually exclusive.
Establishing rights in compilations of information or
databases is equivalent to restoring the legal protection for works
that were protected under the traditional "sweat of the brow"
doctrine." This poses a dilemma, for example, in the case of the
21. Judge Posner notes "one of the most tenacious fallacies about economics

[is the notion that] it is about money. On the contrary, it is about resource
use, money being merely a claim on resources." RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (3d ed. 1986).
22. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352
(1991) (holding that a residential phone directory, or "white pages," did not
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database protection bill that would reinstate the protection for the
compilations of information. This property right is mutually
exclusive from the traditional copyright protection for original
creative expression. A computer program could simultaneously
enjoy protection under the patent and copyright laws. Yet, the
recent database and compilations bill proposals specifically would
not confer any additional protection on a computer program.3 As
a result of the proposed bill's limitation, the question now is
whether it is more economically rational for one to invest
resources in works of original creativity as opposed to the sweat of
brow effort of compiling facts.
The Supreme Court's determination that a minimum level of
requisite originality is necessary for a work under the
Constitution's Copyright Clause forces many new rights to be
established upon another constitutional basis.24 It is likely that
many of the new intellectual property rights will confer economic
rights mutually exclusive of those subject to the creative mandate
of the Patent and Copyright Clause. Instead, the Constitution's
Commerce Clause could be the constitutional basis for many of the
new forms of intellectual property.25 In fact, this is one basis for
the legal protection underlying semiconductor chip mask works.26
It is also likely to be the basis for unoriginal types of works, such
as compilations of information, vessel hull designs, and a national
right of publicity.
This nicely frames the forthcoming discussion-that an
analysis of the exploitation of these rights must recognize that this
is about commercial and economic activity and not about highlevel creativity or abstraction. 27 The key focus in analyzing what

contain the necessary level of original creativity to qualify for copyright
protection, and striking down the traditional sweat of brow doctrine). The
Court notes that with "'sweat of the brow' or 'industrious collection,' the
underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the hard work that
went into compiling facts," without regard to originality in authorship. Id.
23. "The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act," H.R. 2652, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 144 CONG. REC. H3399 (1998); H.R. 354, 106th Cong., 1
Sess., 145 CONG. REC. E84 (1999).
24. Feist Publications,499 U.S. at 363.

25. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl 3. Harvard Professor Arthur Miller testified,
"the use of two constitutional clauses to protect a copyrighted work is nothing
more than using a belt and suspenders to protect that work."
The

Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983, Hearings on S.1201 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1983).

26. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983, Hearings on S.1201
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1983).
27. These species of legal yet intangible property may also be called
"industrial property" or "unintellectual property" depending on your

perspective.
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factors secure or undermine the incentives for investment activity
is more commonly known as risk.
Any nonRisk arises from many different avenues.
2
uniformity in the application of the laws implies risk, decreases
certainty29 and leads to waste."0 The greater the non-uniformity in
the legal system, the greater the risk. The intercircuit conflicts
that exist among the regional appellate courts concerning the
application of economic rights laws create non-uniformity and
increase risk.3"
Economic theory makes several assumptions about risk. In
general, the decision of whether, or how much, to invest is a

function of the firm's risk preference and its ability to estimate the
probability of success." Economists list several questions for a
prospective inventor to gauge uncertainty:
(1) the nature of the payoff;
(2) the degree to which the information is available or outside her
control; and
(3) the ability to reduce relevant uncertainties. 33

Increasing uniformity within a system, as with annealing the
law, decreases many of the relevant uncertainties. In addition,
another very important factor for this problem's analysis is the
extent to which a decision-maker can keep the set of possible
alternatives open, and thus not commit, until more information

28. The dictionary defines "uniformity" as "[clonforming to one rule, mode,
pattern, or unvarying standard; not different at different times or places;
applicable to all places or divisions of a country. Equable; applying alike to all
within a class; sameness . . . the uniformity must be coextensive with the

territory to which it applies." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1530-31 (6th ed.
1990).
29. The dictionary definition reads, '[aibsence of doubt; accuracy; precision;
definite. The quality of being specific, accurate, and distinct." Id. at 225.
30. "[U]ncertainty about what the law requires or permits will encourage
wasteful litigation; and where litigation cannot be avoided, the existence of
apparently inconsistent appellate decisions will add to the costs and other
Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and
burdens of court proceedings."
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989).

31. "[Ilt is important not to equate uncertainty with inconsistency.
Inconsistency does lead to uncertainty, but uncertainty may have many other
causes." Id. at 597.
32. Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1025 n.33 (1989). The
author notes that firms tend to over predict success. Id.
33. Richard R. Nelson, The Link Between Science and Invention: the Case of
the Transistor, in

THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE

ACTMTY:

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 550-51 (Princeton Univ. Press 1962). See
generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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regarding the consequences of any choice is received. 3' These
choices embody the ability to assert one's economic rights and to
promote socially constructive activity.
Policymakers and firms have available several methods to
minimize, if not wholly eliminate, the risk and uncertainty for
investment. In theory, a firm can self-insure against losses
attributed to the inventive process. 5 Economic theory dictates
that when a device is available that can insure against loss, it has
the positive effect of increasing investment to a higher level that is
closer to the societal optimum. 36 Accordingly, economist Kenneth
Arrow postulated that if individuals cannot avoid risk, and there is
no "insurance" mechanism available, then there is less invested on
risky activities than is socially desirable.
As the risk of initiating an investment increases, so does the
likelihood of under-investment in these activities. 8 The public
policy problem is that non-uniformity in the law translates into
societal risks. This is irrefutable and also true for intellectual
property and its related activities. Under-investment in medicine
poses serious risks for the public health. Under-investment in
academic resources and libraries pose risks for the public too.
Inventorship, authorship, film-making, songwriting and compiling
facts are risky activities from an economic perspective.
Congress has the ability to perfect economic rights through
legislation providing for the uniform application of the laws.
Hence it can minimize certain risks by either substantive or
procedural approaches. This policy option is especially evident
from the intellectual property fields where Congress has tried to
guarantee uniformity in the past.
B. Ensuring Uniformity in Intellectual Property
The Supreme Court emphasized that the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution reflects a
fundamental policy to ensure the national uniformity of the
intellectual property laws. It is noted, "[g]reater [legal] certainty
and predictability would foster technological growth and industrial

34. Nelson, supra note 33, at 550-51.
35. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 616 (1962).
36. Id. at 612.
37. Id. at 617.
38. Eisenberg, supranote 32, at 1037.
39. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38
(1964) (holding that intellectual property left within the public domain by

Patent and Copyright laws is not entitled to patent protection); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964) (holding that
government cannot prevent copying information within the public domain).
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innovation and would facilitate business planning."' The national
uniformity present in intellectual property law is considered a
major federal policy objective based on this area's vast history and
tradition, as well as its import in promoting industry and
innovation.4' Congress attempts to execute its constitutional goals
through legislation affecting both the field's substantive and
procedural aspects.
Economic theory states that uniformity in intellectual
property laws serves everyone-authors, inventors and the
public.' The constitutional objective behind intellectual property
is providing a limited private incentive for the public benefit.4
Uniformity in the law serves the public in several important ways.
A strong intellectual property system is not only credited with
getting new works, products, and services to the public. It also
helps moderate prices because it secures relatively low prices by
distributing creation costs (the initial investment) over time and
among many users."
It promotes diverse, voluntary conduct.
Uniformity also brings about the certainty to permit users to
maximize their enjoyment of works and products in the most
economically sound fashion possible.
The important economic and societal interests at stake make
intellectual property a frequent beneficiary of statutory attempts
for uniformity, especially regarding the substantive provisions of
the law.
Recent legislative activity in intellectual property
illustrates an attempt to increase uniformity and certainty, while
minimizing waste. One motivation may be the push of special
interest groups within the business community. Regardless, the
40. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
41. The four traditional goals of the federal intellectual property law
system are considered to be innovation, public disclosure, free competition,
and uniformity. Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of
Inventions Meeting Judicial Standardsof Patentability,87 HARV. L. REV. 807,
819 (1974).
42. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557
(1998) (arguing that technological means relating to the licensing of

copyrighted material will narrow the fair use doctrine). As a general rule, "as
property rights to an asset grow more uncertain, the discounted present value

of the income stream derived from the asset decreases." Id. at 588 n.140,
(citing DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 271-72 (1986)).

43. "Lawmakers enacted the Copyright Act to cure an alleged case of
market failure: creating a work can cost authors a good deal, whereas copying
a work costs free riders very little." Id. at 582. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT'S

HIGHWAY:

FROM GUTENBERG

TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX

(1994).
44. "In general, an asset's current price internalizes the value of its future
income stream." Bell, supra note 42, at 588, (citing EDGAR K BROWNING &
JACQUELINE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 11820 (1983) and DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 265-67 (1986)).
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results were beneficial to both individual rights-holders and
arguably to the public. Everyone benefits through increased
voluntary activity (e.g., use and marketplace transactions), the
promotion of innovation, and a level of litigation closer to the
societal optimum. Wasteful litigation imposes costs throughout
society, including on firms, rights-holders, and consumers.
Wasteful litigation also strains the limited resources of the
government and the courts.
In copyright law, several such important changes were
adopted in the monumental 1976 law revisions including several
attempts for providing certainty for both authors and users.45 The
authors and owners of copyrights benefited under the 1976
copyright act through its establishment of federal preemption and
clearer definitions and standards developed regarding the scope of
copyright, its term, and fair use."'
In recent years, there were other important substantive
legislative actions striving to anneal other forms of intellectual
property by increasing legal uniformity and certainty. Legislation
in recent congressional sessions attempted to enact additional
reforms for patent4 7 and trademark law.48 Recent bills establishing
new species of intellectual property also attempt to ensure
uniformity by preempting state law.49
45. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 857, 887 (1987).
46. Id. at 886. In addition, the academic community and other users
enjoyed at least a level of "minimal certainty" in areas such as fair use for
educators regarding photocopying and other common uses. Id. at 887. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994); L. RAY PATTERSON ET AL., THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USER'S RIGHTS 191-224 (1991).
47. In patent law, a patent's term of duration was changed from 17 years
from issuance to 20 years from the application's filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)
(1994). This change arises from the U.S.'s implementation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). Despite this attempt to delineate
a uniform and certain patent term, there are a variety of procedures for
extending a patent's term. A term can be expended, for example, in response
to time lost due to Federal Drug Administration review of pharmaceutical or
medical devices. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994). There were also attempts to permit the early
publication of pending patent applications. H.R. 359, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (introduced by Rep. Rohrabacher for early patent application
publication at five years of pendency); H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995)
(introduced by Rep. Moorhead for 18-month early patent application
publication); H.R. 400, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (omnibus patent reform
package introduced by Rep. Coble that includes 18-month publication); S.507,
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1997) (omnibus patent reform introduced by Sen. Hatch
that includes 18-month publication).
48. The 1997 Trademark Dilution Act created a minimum national uniform
standard for trademark dilution claims. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 43(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051 et seq. (1994).
49. "Collections of Information Antipiracy Act" H.R. 2652, 105th Cong., 1st
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In addition to the many statutory provisions ensuring
uniformity in the substance of the laws in a particular field, legal
history shows that proper prescription of procedural rules crafting
court jurisdiction increases uniformity.
C. FederalJurisdictionand Uniformity
In tracing the legal uniformity, clarity, and certainty that the
U.S. legal system provides to encourage creative and industrial
activity, one must study the jurisdiction of the courts. Regardless
of how we structure the intermediate appellate tier of review, the
United States Supreme Court, the nation's highest court of last
resort, remains the ultimate consolidated court of final appeal. Its
place at the top of the legal hierarchy is reserved to resolve those
cases that it decides present the appropriate level of legal
abstraction or national importance."
If one of the most desirable, if not notable, features of the U.S.
intellectual property system is its uniformity, then it is a result of
years of congressional refinement upon federal court jurisdiction
and its legal procedures. This is especially true with patent law.
For this reason patent law supplies a useful case study for the
proposition that the forum and the dispute resolution procedures
can positively shape the substance of the law.
Congress has great latitude in this area since, as discussed
earlier, the substance of patent law is predicated on one
constitutional foundation, ' and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts upon another.52 Based on their experience with the Articles
of Confederation, the Founders realized the inherent problem of
competing state patent systems. As a result they took care to
prepare for a single federal system through the Patent and
Copyright Clause. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the federal
supremacy of the substance of patent law in the Sears-Compco
cases. 5 In analyzing the historical importance of the legacy of
Sess. § 2 (1997). Section 1205(b) reads:
Preemption of State Law.- On or after the effective date of this chapter,
all rights that are equivalent to the rights specified in section 1202 with
respect to the subject matter of this chapter shall be governed
exclusively by Federal law, and no person is entitled to any equivalent
right in such subject matter under the common law or statutes of any
State, State laws with respect to trademark, design rights, antitrust,
trade secrets, privacy, access to public documents, and the law of

contract shall not be deemed to provide equivalent rights for purposes of
this subsection.
Id. § 1205(b).
50. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (presenting thoughts on how the courts should

expand constitutional doctrine).
51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (concerning patents and copyrights).
52. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (concerning judicial power).
53. See cases cited supra note 39.
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uniformity of in these areas, Justice Black takes care to note that
subject matter jurisdiction 54 predates general federal diversity

jurisdiction.55
The broad interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1338's "arising under"
language provides that a vast variety of domestic controversies in
this area are subject to the federal courts, 6 as well as limited
extraterritorial circumstances.
The jurisdictional statute
contributes to the substantive uniformity in the law. 58
The early patent laws reflected Anglo-American principles
and procedures of the time, and with this, the historical separation
between an action at law and an equitable remedy. 59 However,
this created a separation of patent remedies available between the
state and federal courts. 5
This legal tension posed severe
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1948). This section was enacted in 1948, yet contains
the provisions from earlier statutes. Section 1338 reads:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be
exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection
and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial
and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection,
or trademark laws.,
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1948) (June 25, 1948, § 1, 62 Stat. 931; Dec. 24, 1970, Pub.
L. 91-577, § 143(b), 84 Stat. 1559). Section 1338 is a consolidation of two prior
federal statutes regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The first was
28 U.S.C. § 41(7) (1911), which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of all suits at law
or in equity arising under the patent, the copyright, and the trade-mark
laws.
28 U.S.C. § 41(7) (1911). The second statute was 28 U.S.C. § 371(5) (1911),
that reads:
The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in the cases
and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the courts
of the several states .... Of all cases arising under the patent-right, or
copyright laws of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 371(5) (1911).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1998). See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S.
225, 231 n.7 (1964).
56. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 738, 822-27
(1824).
57. See Update Art, Inc. v. Modin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating the general rule that there is no extra territorial jurisdiction,
except where the infringement "permits further reproduction abroad").
58. Congress considers the language of § 1338 "substantial" and unlikely to
spur frivolous claims into the federal district, and likewise, federal circuit
courts. S. REP. NO. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29 [hereinafter FederalCircuitReport].
59. The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1
Stat. 109.
60. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of
Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338,
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difficulties for many patent owners.
Early in the Republic's history, Congress relied on its federal
supremacy for its legislative attempts to clarify the uniformity of
the patent law."' In the second patent act that Congress passed in
1793, special care was taken to grant the federal courts concurrent
jurisdiction over patent infringement claims and to prevent the
proliferation of state patents.62 Congress finally developed the
notion for subject matter jurisdiction for copyright and patents by
continually narrowing, and finally ending the requirement of
diversity for these cases." This trend of tailoring the jurisdiction
of court, in turn, increased uniformity in the law. The trend to
promote legal uniformity continues today and the Federal Circuit
is an important example.
The uncertainty arising out of the non-uniform jurisdictional
procedures was a morass that in some cases rendered patent
rights virtually meaningless. The Patent Act of 1793, despite all of
its good, still effectively allowed for the state courts to declare a
federal patent invalid in many cases. 4 The law-equity distinction
also threatened patent rights due to anomalous situations arising
under various procedural postures.6
Congress did not confer
365 (1992) (discussing the necessity of invoking the federalism debate in the
course of analyzing the role of uniformity intellectual property).
61. This comports with the intent of the Constitution's Patent and
Copyright Clause. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271-81 (James Madison)
(Bantam Books 1982) for the Framers' intent.
62. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 3d Cong., 1 Stat. 318, 322.
That where a state, before its adoption of the present form of
government shall have granted an exclusive right to any invention, the
party, claiming the right, shall not be capable of obtaining an exclusive
right under this act, but on relinquishing his right under such particular
state, and of such relinquishment his obtaining an exclusive right under
this act shall be sufficient evidence.
Id. § 7.
63. A plaintiff was able to bring a copyright case to the federal circuit
courts, which had original jurisdiction over copyright cases, if there was
sufficient diversity jurisdiction in place, consisting of parties from different
states and an amount of at least $500 in controversy. Act of Feb. 15, 1819,
15th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 Stat. 481. In 1873, the federal court received exclusive
jurisdiction over patent and copyright cases. Act of Dec. 1, 1873, § 711, 43d
Cong., 1st Sess. In 1875, general federal question jurisdiction was established,
but the requirement for a minimum amount in controversy was retained.
64. Doerfer, supra note 19, at 1439. Today, state courts may also decide
validity in certain circumstances. Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 926 F.2d
1574, 1581 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that "[i]n at least some cases, a state
court deciding a suit... may consider... invalidity").
65. In certain cases, a patent owner was unable to recover substantial
monetary relief even though the infringer may have derived high profits from
his activities:
The law-equity distinction created a particular hardship for patent
owners who (1) could not prove lost profits or an established royalty in
an action at law, and (2) could not allege a basis for equitable
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equitable jurisdiction upon the federal courts for patent cases until
later in the Nineteenth Century.66 Thus, the federal regional
circuit courts fully and finally gained jurisdiction in both cases at
law and in equity with the Patent Act of 1836.67 Of course, the
circuit courts of that era were quite different from the modern
institution of today's judiciary. The need for uniformity in patent
appeals continued even as the modern federal system developed.
The establishment of the regional circuit courts of appeals
bred other problems. Again, the severe intercircuit conflicts
within the federal tier of review rendered some patents worthless

and totally deprived them of their national character.

A great

concern regarding patent conflicts among the circuits emerged
under Kessler v. Eldred," which held that the validity of a patent
was limited to its circuit. The result was a balkanization among
the circuits where a manufacturer could send patented goods with
"impunity" into the one judicial circuit, even when the underlying
patent was invalidated by the court of another circuit. 9 A 1959
Senate Judiciary Committee study recounted these anomalous

jurisdiction to issue an injunction because the patent had expired or the
defendant had ceased his infringing activity.
DONALD S. CHISUM, 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 10-20 (1998) [hereinafter
CHISUM ON PATENTS].
66. There is continuing academic debate as to whether federal jurisdiction
first became exclusive under the 1800 Act or the 1836 Act. Donald S. Chisum,
The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent
Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1971). Section 3 of the Act of 1800
provides that damages "may be recovered, by action on the case founded on
this and the above-mentioned act, in the circuit court of the United States,
having jurisdiction thereof." Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat 37. (1800).
Section 17 of the Act of 1836 states:
That all actions, suits, controversies, and cases arising under the law of
the United States, granting or conforming to investors the exclusive
right to their inventions or discoveries, shall be originally cognizable, as
well in equity as at law, by the circuit courts of the United States, or any
district court having the power and jurisdiction.
Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117.
67. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 § 17, 5 Stat. 117. The statute provides that
"all actions .

.

.

and cases arising under any law of the United States,

granting or confirming to inventors the exclusive right to their inventions or
discoveries, shall be originally cognizable, as well in equity as at law, by the
circuit courts of the United States." CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 65, § 217. Congress first attempted to confer law and equity jurisdiction to the circuit
courts in the Patent Act of 1819. Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481-82.
However, it is observed that this did not automatically confer a right to
equitable relief, it merely eliminated certain jurisdictional obstacles. CHISUM
ON PATENTS, supra note 65, § 20-13.
68. 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
69. Single Court of Patent Appeals - A Legislative Hearing, Study of the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1959).
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results:
Ever since... patent appeals to the circuit courts of appeal were
substituted for direct appeals to the Supreme Court, patent
appellate procedure has been the target for criticism because of the
delay and inconsistencies supposedly resulting from nine different
jurisdictions-and subsequently, even more-reaching independent
decisions on the validity of patents, despite the fact that the
national reach of the patent grant makes a single uniform national
decision highly desirable.
This echoes the same concerns that could be said of other
contemporary types of intellectual property and trade laws arising
from severe intercircuit conflicts.
The ultimate result of consolidating federal appellate
jurisdiction is a uniformity in the application of the laws. The
unique concerns of patent law were a driving concern in this
pioneering approach. Yet, despite the clear result, Congress's true
motivation in enacting the statute is not clear even today.
Professor Donald Chisum notes that neither uniformity nor
technical expertise of the federal bench were the primary goals of
Congress in enacting these statutes. Instead the intended benefit
may have been overcoming the defects of the "perceived
impropriety" of the state court systems reviewing some patent
71
cases.
One of the most important and recent jurisdictional
modifications that demonstrates that process can positively shape
the substance, again was in patent law with the Federal Circuit's
establishment in 1982. By creating this consolidated appellate
forum, Congress secured an even greater degree of uniformity and
certainty for patent law and the other fields within its jurisdiction.
D. Uniformity and CircuitConflicts
While the federal courts contribute to the remarkable success
of increased uniformity, it is not completely possible to structure a
forum to foster absolute uniformity.12 Large regional courts of
appeals prove that conflicts may emerge from differences among
various intracircuit panels. It is worth discussing the role of the
panel within the appellate court structure.
The magnitude of the intracircuit inconsistency problem is
not directly related to the size of the circuit court and its total

70. Id. Testimony in the study of Frederick P. Fish noted, "[wihen a patent
comes before.., a circuit court of appeals, no other court is bound by that
adjudication, except as between the particular parties and their privies." Id.
71. Chisum, supra note 66, at 637.
72. The Federal Circuit applies the procedural law of the regional circuit
where the case was tried. Atari, Inc. v. J S & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,
1438-39 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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number of judges.73 In addition, the problem of inconsistency may
be inherent to the nature of our legal system.74
Some
commentators believe that the inconsistency arising from panel
decisions is a relatively minor problem of the current appellate
system and not a justification for the creation of specialty courts of
appeals.75
The real threat that inconsistent panels present to uniformity
in the law is another important factor in examining an appellate
court structure, its benefits to litigants, and the shaping of the
law. This may be addressed by a number of procedures, including
the use of en banc panels." The proposal to create an intercircuit
tribunal was considered and rejected by Congress several years
ago.77 Another way to reduce this uncertainty and to reduce the
number of these various regional courts of appeals intracircuit
conflicts is to reduce the number appellate courts that consider
these issues. A consolidated court of appeals such as the Federal
Circuit is our only permanent example of such a system. It is
considered a superior model for a tribunal than the specialty court.
Specialty courts are viewed as a solution to the frustration
arising from the intercircuit conflicts among the regional courts of
appeals." Judge Posner suggests that one solution to the crisis of
73. "[A] homogenous bench of twenty-eight is no more likely to issue
inconsistent decisions than an equally homogenous bench of twelve.
Conversely, an ideologically divided court of twelve will be no less prone to

inconsistency than an ideologically divided court of twenty-eight." Hellman,
supra note 30, at 546.
74. "[MIuch of the concern about unpredictability in a large court of appeals
rests ultimately on an impatience with the case-by-case mode of adjudication

that is the essence of our common law system." Id. at 598.
75. "Occasional inconsistencies in panel decisions may be a small price to
pay... against the likely consequences of establishing specialized appellate
courts-fragmentation of the law, tunnel vision, interest group dominated
appointments, and centralization of power." Id. at 600.
76. "[En banc decisions contributed only minimally to the preservation of

uniformity in the law of the Ninth Circuit." Id. at 550.
77. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, Apr. 2, 1990, at
109.
78. Currently, specialized appellate courts of limited jurisdiction include
the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

Court of Review. Specialized trial courts include the Bankruptcy Courts, the
Tax Court, the Court of International Trade, the Court of Federal Claims. See
Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 3 n.17. S. Jay Plager notes:
(1) there are important conceptual and perhaps operational differences
between a 'specialized' court and a non-regional subject matter court; (2)
untested assumptions about such courts and their judges-their
incentives, shared beliefs, origins, psychopathology, what have you-are

not particularly useful; (3) little is known, empirically and verifiably,
about whether such courts behave differently than geographically-based

appellate courts, and if so, how, in what ways, and with what
consequences.
S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and
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caseload and complex subject matter of the federal courts is to
implement a system of many, small specialized courts. 9 Yet, the
specialty court is not a judicial panacea and is unfavored for many
reasons. There is a strong sentiment that generalist judges
improve the legal system through the cross-pollinization of legal
ideas.8" (This oddly presumes that some judges are intellectually
isolated by their court and are never in contact with any new ideas
brought forward from the many diverse avenues of legal
community, litigants, clerks, and journals.)
The lesson of the intracircuit conflict is that a jumbo-sized
appellate court must be avoided. In practice, a consolidated
national court of appeals of a moderate size demonstrates its merit
in addressing a variety of problems at an acceptable cost.
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: HISTORY, ADVANTAGES, AND
DISADVANTAGES

The Federal Circuit's history is extensively described in many
sources and recounts many distinguished figures." Justice Harlan
is credited with advancing the idea of the court when he suggested
a "national court of last resort" for patent appeals in 1887.82 Judge
Learned Hand must also be credited, because of his long-lived
interest in increasing the judiciary's expertise in this area. Judge
Hand testified in favor of a national appellate patent court before
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1958.83 The issue came to
fruition as part of the Carter Administration's efforts to improve
the judiciary and with the President's appointment of Griffin B.
Bell as U.S. Attorney General, and Daniel J. Meador as Assistant
Attorney General. The Honorable Pauline Newman testified in
support of the court before she joined the ranks of its distinguished

the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a
Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 866 (1990).
79. POSNER, supra note 2, at 245.

80. Id. at 258.
81. Federal CircuitReport, supra note 58, at 11. See generally THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY, 1982-1990
(Marion T. Bennett, ed.)
82. See Howard T. Markey, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Challenge and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 595, 596 (1985) (discussing the
historical development of the recognition for the need of uniformity in specific
fields of law).
83. Single Court of Patent Appeals - A Legislative Hearing, Study of the
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. 22 (1959). Mr. Frederick P. Fish of

Boston testified in favor of such a court on behalf of the American Bar
Association. Id. at 12-13. See also Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
ConsiderationsRegarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 58 (1901)
(formulating the position that specialization of courts, especially where expert
testimony is necessary, would form a more consistent line of precedent).
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jurists 4
Briefly, the origins of the Federal Circuit reflect decades of
work to achieve several important goals. The first is proceduralthe interest in improving the national appellate structure. 8 The
second is substantive-the interest in improving certain fields of
law by nationwide uniformity where a "special need" is identified.86
At the time, one of the greatest special needs resided with
improving intellectual property, and in turn, the nation's
industrial base hand-in-hand with a totally new court structure.
The court's goals were enumerated as creating an appellate forum
for cases where there is a special need for nationwide uniformity,
improving the administration of patent law through a centralized
appeals process, and improving the procedures for government
claims cases."
Ironically, the establishment of the Federal Circuit was
possible because it earned support from some of the key opponents
of "specialized courts."8 9
Their support was based on the
uniqueness of patent law. The new court-a court of consolidated
jurisdiction that is not a specialty court-has jurisdiction
comprising that of the predecessor courts and those fields of law
84. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or
Judicial Activism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 687-88 (1993) [hereinafter The
Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or JudicialActivism] (expressing her view
that a centralized court would provide 'a greatly enhanced degree of
predictability of the outcome of patent litigation"). There are many other
professionals who worked toward the court's establishment, including
Congressmen Robert W. Kastenmeier and Thomas F. Railsback, Senators
Dennis W. DeConcini and Robert Dole, and House Judiciary Committee staff
Thomas E. Mooney, Michael J. Remington, and Bruce Lehman. Readers are
encouraged to review the previously cited historical sources regarding the
numerous other individuals in the public and private sectors who made a
contribution in this effort.
85. FederalCircuitReport, supra note 58, at 1. The report cites some of the
prominent studies of the time regarding the federal judiciary's structure,
including the Freund Committee (1972) and the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate system (the "Hruska" Commission) Pub. L. No.
92-849, 86 Stat. 807 (Oct. 13, 1972), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88
Stat. 1153. Id. at 11.
86. In addition, Congress sought to improve the resolution of trials for
claims against the federal government. Federal CircuitReport, supra note 58,
at 12.
87. The Federal Circuit: JudicialStability or JudicialActivism, supra note
84, at 684 (citing Advisory Comm. on Indus. Innovation, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Final Rep. (1979)).
88. FederalCircuitReport, supra note 58, at 12.
89. Senator Patrick J. Leahy, an opponent of specialty courts even for
complex litigation such as that concerning environmental and tax laws,
supported the establishment of the Federal Circuit, when he stated "I believe
that patent law stands apart from virtually every other legal discipline both in
its extreme focus on science and technology and its need for uniformity in
decision-making." Federal CircuitReport, supra note 58, at 39.

1999]

FederalCircuit's Forgotten Lessons?

that were predicted to benefit from national treatment. 90 Congress
established the Federal Circuit in 1982 by combining the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Court of Claims.91
The Federal Circuit, the only permanent consolidated
national court of appeals, is a departure from the traditional
regional appellate court.92
While its structure represents a
philosophical and pragmatic change, its operation maintains
traditional values. It keeps the judiciary's enduring goals of
resolving controversies and shaping the law. The Federal Circuit
continues the traditional, historical goals and functions of the
appellate court system. These are a part of our legal system that
even predate the Evarts Act's passage that, a century ago,
established the traditional three-tier federal judicial system of
today.
There are several jurisprudential justifications for a unified
court of appeals.
The Federal Circuit is credited with an
annealing of the law through the important advantages of
increasing uniformity,93 doctrinal stability94 and predictability
within the bodies of law in its jurisdiction. 95 Other advantages97
96
include a reduction in intercircuit conflicts, of waste and costs,

90. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
See infra pp. 604-05 and note 129.
91. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, supra note 4.
92. The Temporary Court of Appeals (TECA) was another consolidated
appellate court, but it was not permanent. Congress established TECA in
1971 as part of the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments, which
established price controls. TECA was abolished in 1992. CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND
RELATED MATTERS, § 4105 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1999).
93. Past United States Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner Harry
F. Manbeck, Jr. remarked "[the first ten years of the Federal Circuit
jurisprudence has restored efficiency and reliability to the patent law." Jon F.
Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent Influence
of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 579, 579 (Aug. 1994) (citing
Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit-FirstTen Years of Patentability
Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 499, 504 (1992)). "Not many other fields
have experienced the happy annealing of ideological splits that patent law, at
least temporarily, has." POSNER, supra note 2, at 253. "One generally
unforeseen consequence of establishing a specialized patent court is that the
conceptual strands of patent law have been integrated into a coherent whole."
Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 21.
94. Federal CircuitReport, supra note 58, at 15.
95. Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit,57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 318 (1984).
96. "[C]leavage in views on patent law had generated persistent intercircuit
disagreements over the scope of patent protection" POSNER, supra note 2, at
253. "By making one appellate court responsible for the development of the
law in particular areas, Congress, in a single stroke, eliminated intercircuit
conflicts and achieved uniformity." Id. Yet, the court has not eliminated the
problem of the intracircuit conflict. See supra at p. 107.
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and in the caseload of the federal judiciary,98 while still spurring
innovation.99 Another great advantage was eliminating forum
shopping, especially in patent cases."' This development was
badly needed as evidenced by Judge Henry J. Friendly's famous
description of the "mad and undignified race" for forum shopping
that was typical in patent cases.1
The Federal Circuit is itself an innovation. Its establishment
reflects the reality of global economic and technological trends, as
well as the United State's fiscal evolution into a high-tech
economy. Certain bodies of law, including patents, now occupy a
highlighted place in the economy that the legal community must
specially recognize." 2 The positive value of such a court structure
is evidenced in its effect on industrial innovation, 1° "the nation's
technological
strength
and
international
[trade
and]
competitiveness." 4
M

97. "[Without knowing where a patent would be litigated, it became
impossible to adequately counsel technology developers or users. In such a
legal environment, the promise of a patent could hardly be considered
sufficient incentive to invest in research and development." Dreyfuss, supra
note 40, at 7. See also Consideringthe AppropriateAllocation of Judgeships in
the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Second and Eighth Circuits and the First,
Third, and Federal Circuits Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
132 (1997) (statement of then-Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Glenn L.
Archer, Jr., discussing the financial efficiency of the Federal Circuit)
[hereinafter Archer Testimony].
98. "[The number of appeals resulting from attempts to obtain different
rulings on disputed legal points can be expected to decrease." Federal Circuit
Report, supra note 58, at 15.
99. "If it is to be a court that oversees technological progress, then it must
interpret its jurisdictional grant accordingly and drop its reluctance to
construe federal law independently." Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 64.
100. In contrast, one author notes, "[florum shopping could, however, be
cured procedurally with a clear definition of what it means for a patent claim
to be frivolous (backed up, perhaps, with stringent penalties) and with a strict
doctrine of res judicata." Id.
101. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit-A Reminiscence, 14 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. 513, 516 (1992) [hereinafter The Federal Circuit-A
Reminiscence]. Commentators have written about the wide divergence of law
"among regions of the country." Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 6-7. "It is no
wonder that forum shopping was rampant, and.., a request to transfer a
patent infringement [between circuits was] bitterly fought ...and, ultimately
in the Supreme Court.". Id. at 7.
102. The Federal Circuit: JudicialStability or JudicialActivism, supra note
84, at 686.
103. "[Clhannelling patent cases into a single appellate forum would create a
stable, uniform law 'and would eliminate forum shopping. Greater certainty
and predictability would foster technological growth and industrial innovation
and would facilitate business planning." Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 7.
104. The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or JudicialActivism, supra note
84, at 685.
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A. Criticism of the Federal Circuit
There is a dazzling array of criticism aimed at the Federal
Circuit from many quarters in the legal community. From the
court's beginning and continuing today, these performance
criticisms are rooted in its consolidated court of appeals structure.
These broad claims include the propositions that the Federal
Circuit has been captured by the "pro-patent" forces; contributes to
an over-specialization of judges; yields poorly written opinions;' °5
encourages judicial activism;106 and leads to tunnel vision;"°7
extremism, a loss of objectivity and diversity among circuits;"°8 and
special interest group control of judges. 109 A national consolidated
court system is criticized for potentially losing the congeniality
necessary for a well-functioning appellate court. 10 Any nationwide
court based in the U.S. Capitol is also criticized for representing a
trend in the concentration of Washington power."
105. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 312. "[T]his isolation, coupled with the
repetitive nature of the workload, is unlikely to attract the most talented
jurists." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 150 (1986). There is,
however, no objective evidence supporting the argument that the quality or
competence of a consolidated court are inferior than those of any of regional
court of appeal. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 250.
106. "The shaping of the patent law is to an exceptional degree in the hands
of the judiciary, for in patent cases a relatively simple statutory law is applied
to an extraordinary complexity of factual circumstances." The Federal Circuit:
JudicialStability or JudicialActivism, supra note 84, at 685.
107. The repetitity of the same types of cases gives rise to the criticism of the
judges developing a narrow perspective. Judge Henry J. Friendly disagreed
with the tunnel vision criticism by noting, "the generalist judge is more
susceptible to distorted perception because he rarely hears a patent case."
Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19396 (1979). See Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 308. Judge Friendly was
addressing this issue in the context of tax cases. Id.
108. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 313. They note that court supporters
argue that while diversity may have a role concerning the common law, it has
no place in the interpretation of a federal statute. Id.
109. Judge Posner argues that the one-dimensional nature of the docket will
make such judges vulnerable to lobbyists, congressional committees, private
watchdog groups, and hence their positions will be susceptible to ideological
appointments.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 252.
The neutrality of the
appointment process is defended on the grounds that specialty groups and
practitioners are sufficiently on both sides of the issue. Case & Miller, supra
note 95, at 310-11.
110. Statement of Jon Newman, United States Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, before the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited Apr. 5, 1999)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/newyork/0424NEWM.htm> (reporting
the comments of the Honorable Jon Newman, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit). Judge Jon Newman is considered by some as one the
great copyright jurists of our time.
111. See Additional Views of Senator Max Baucus on S. 1700 - The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1981, in Federal Circuit Report, supra note 58, at
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B. FederalCircuit Results

The successful results of the Federal Circuit's experiment
have confirmed many of its supporters' hopes. In 1984, two
commentators concluded that the Federal Circuit "will foster
greater uniformity in patent law-at an acceptable cost if
generalist judges occupy the bench-and a concomitant decrease
in forum shopping and litigation costs.""2 The court's success also

disproved
naysayers whose fears were appreciably wrong on some
3
counts.1

It is worth addressing the "pro-patent" criticism of the court
in some detail, since this Article argues that the new forms of
intellectual property are some of the best candidates for inclusion
in the expanded exclusive appellate jurisdiction of a consolidated
national court. These candidates are those that primarily convey
morally-neutral, economic rights that concern investment,
international trade and competitiveness, and innovation. Thus,
whether a forum is "pro-patent," or disposed toward any form of
property or legal position, questions the competence of the court in
intellectual property areas, and it is a charge that deserves very
close scrutiny.
No one doubts that the Federal Circuit is responsible for the
renaissance in patent law."4 Yet, there is a clear distinction
between fairly adjudicating cases in an area of the law and "rubber
stamping" all plaintiffs' patent cases." 5 The Federal Circuit has
presided over several important legal developments. One study
concluded that the court presided over a significant evolution in a
number of patent law areas including validity, obviousness," 6 the
40 (stating that "Em]any of us in Congress have been greatly disturbed by the

growing trend toward centralizing decisionmaking in Washington, D.C."). Of
course, a consolidated appellate court may be located outside Washington.
Judge Posner notes that national tribunals are sometimes located elsewhere,

for example, the Railroad Retirement Board is headquartered in Illinois.
POSNER, supra note 2, at 258 n.24. Judge Posner further notes that video and
computer technology may change the need for an appellate court to have any

particular physical site. Id. The Federal Circuit was created with Congress'
expectation that it would "ride the circuit" and hear cases around the country.
Id.
112. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 301.
113. See id. (stating that the Federal Circuit "will fail, however, to spur
innovation among stagnant American industries").
114. Robert L. Risberg, Comment, Five Years Without Infringement
Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Unmasking the
Spectre of Chip Piracy In an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process
Technologies, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 241, 245 (1990).
115. "Similarly, the uninformed, unsupported, and unsupportable assertion

that the Federal Circuit might somehow become biased in favor of patents has
apparently by now foundered on the facts." Howard T. Markey, The Federal
Circuit and CongressionalIntent, 2 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 303, 305 (1992).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1998).
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on-sale bar, 7 infringement, the doctrine of equivalents,
injunctions, damages, affirmative defenses, and the attorney-client
privilege."'
The Federal Circuit also presided over a quantitative change
in its jurisdiction. Proponents of establishing the court predicted a
change in the caseload. However, its caseload has exceeded
expectations. 19 Despite the expected results, the amount of patent
litigation has increased.'
The increased number of patent cases
is attributed to a greater certainty arising out of the uniformity
possible through a national consolidated court of appeals. This
certainty and enhanced coherency in patent law rejuvenated
industry and increased patenting activity at a rate outpacing the
reductions in efficiency."'
Philosophers can ponder whether these results indicate if
there ever may be too much doctrinal stability or certainty in a
legal system or appellate court."' Likewise, one can also question
whether the development of a stable body of law could result in a
stale body of law. Congress usually has a legislative answer.
The renaissance in patent rights may be measured by the
increase in patent litigation by those seeking effective remedies. 3
It is notable that there is an increase in patent litigation since it is

117. Id. § 102(b).
118. Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth
Anniversary Look at its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 1087, 1092 (1988). Sobel concludes, "the Federal Circuit has profoundly

affected patent jurisprudence. The strengthened patent comes at a time when
intellectual property is of special value in this country relative to other forms
of industrial wealth." Id. at 1139.
119. The original forecast for the caseload of the Federal Circuit was 900
cases per year; in 1991 the court had over 1600 filings. The Federal CircuitA Reminiscence, supra note 101, at 522-23. The court's caseload has risen as
high as 2,000 in prior years. Id. The court's caseload in 1997 totaled 1462
cases. Archer Testimony, supra note 97, at 109. The Federal Circuit's original
caseload estimate was smaller than for the other regional courts of appeals,
but this was considered appropriate due to the greater complexity of the cases,
especially the patent jurisdiction. Federal CircuitReport, supra note 58, at 17.
This estimate was based on the caseload of the predecessor courts and the new
patent and federal contract jurisdiction. Id. This increase reminds one of the
line from the film Field of Dreams, "If you build it, they will come."
120. In 1980, the number of nationwide patent appeals filed totaled 119. In
1979, 192 patent appeals were filed, and 163 patent appeals were filed in
1978. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 324. Patent appeals represent only one
percent of the total federal appellate docket. Id.
121. POSNER, supra note 2, at 253.
122. "Now that the law has become easier to discern, the CAFC may have
saddled itself with new business as parties opt for judicial resolution of their
cases." Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 24.
123. "Many patent attorneys and litigators attribute an observed 50%
increase in patent litigation during the 1980s to the CAFC's rulings." Merz &
Pace, supra note 93, at 580.
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among the most expensive types of litigation. 12' Economics explain
this expense by pointing to justified rational rights-holders
seeking their expected relief.
The best retort to all of the Federal Circuit's critics lies in
reviewing its success through its decisions, and their effect on the
law. This success is also confirmed by the Federal Circuit's
litigants, and Congress' support in terms12 of funding and past
attempts to expand the court's jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit's diverse jurisdiction supports the
conclusion that it is not a specialized court.'26 Today, patent
appeals constitute a minority of the court's docket in terms of both
filings and its workload. Patent filings comprise less than onethird of its appellate docket, and a minority of the court's
workload.'27
The Federal Circuit's diverse jurisdiction is provided by a
statute that ensures it is a consolidated, rather than a specialty
cofirt."
Congress decided that the Federal Circuit should have
the exclusive jurisdiction to hear all appeals from the district
courts arising in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), with
the exception of federal copyright or trademark cases."9 Section
1338 provides "original and exclusive" jurisdiction to the U.S.
District Courts for patent cases.' 30 The jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit includes appeals of Internal Revenue Service cases from
the district courts, appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
appeals of the decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
regarding patent applications and interferences, trademark
registration and related proceedings, appeals of the U.S. Court of
International Trade, final determinations of the U.S. International
Trade Commission, and federal government contracts either by the
referral of the head of any executive department or agency, or the

124. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 321.
125. See Archer Testimony, supra note 97, at 105 (detailing recent additions
to the court's jurisdiction and congressional review of the court).
126. Plager, supra note 78, at 866. Plager notes:
(1) there are important conceptual and perhaps operational differences
between a 'specialized' court and a non-regional subject matter court; (2)
untested assumptions about such courts and their judges-their
incentives, shared beliefs, origins, psychopathology, what have you-are

not particularly useful; (3) little is known, empirically and verifiably,
about whether such courts behave differently than geographically-based
appellate courts, and if so, in what ways, and with what consequences.

Id.
127. Archer Testimony, supra note 97, at 123-24.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1991). This statute confers jurisdiction to the Federal

Circuit but does not create a cause of action. Id. The Federal Circuit's current
jurisdiction consists entirely of civil, but no criminal, law areas.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1998).

130. Id.
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relevant board of contract appeals. 3'
An inviting and equally important policy question is whether
the Federal Circuit's success may be emulated by expanding its
jurisdiction in order to improve other bodies of federal law. 3 '
Critics of the Federal Circuit have long predicted that the court's
jurisdiction will "inevitably expand at the expense of the
jurisdiction of the regional circuit courts of appeal."133 (This
allegation invokes the specter of judicial gerrymandering!) Yet,
the creation of new types of federal intellectual property provides a
unique opportunity to defy this zero-sum game logic. Congress
may expand the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit without
transferring any existing jurisdiction from the regional courts of
appeals. This Article now turns to study the challenges presented
by the exciting opportunities upcoming through new legislation.
III.

NEW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Two new types of federal intellectual property were the
Both legislative
subject of recent Congressional efforts.134 '
measures convey economic rights. The first was the Vessel Hull
Design Protection Act (Vessel Act),'3' legislation that would
provide protection against the copying of a ship hull design. The
Vessel Act addresses the Supreme Court case Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc."6

The second was the Collections of

Information Antipiracy Act,'37 legislation to provide protection
against the misappropriation of databases. The concern over
database protection arises from the Supreme Court case Feist
Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.'38

One noticeable feature of these bills is that they establish
federal district court trials and provide appeal to the appropriate
131. Id. A law professor of mine suggested that its jurisdiction earned it the
title, "The Boring Court." Some have suggested that the court received the

jurisdiction other judges loathed.
132. Recently this very question

was presented. See supra note 8. But see
Risberg, supra note 114, at 276 (advising Congress to remain wary of
expanding the scope of jurisdiction).

133. Case & Miller, supra note 95, at 301.
134. This Article will not attempt to discuss all of the many substantive
provisions involving these proposals except to say that any new economic
rights are important and deserve to be drafted so as to be strong rights and
have effective corresponding remedies.
135. H.R. 2696, 105th Cong., 1 Sess., 144 CONG. REC. H1243 (1998); Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.)
2860.
136. 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (holding that a Florida state ship hull
anticopying law was preempted by the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause).

137. See supra note 23.
138. 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding that a residential phone directory or
"white pages" did not contain the necessary level of creativity to qualify for
copyright protection).
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regional court of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. This will increase
uniformity by fixing the jurisdiction within the federal system.
Likewise, vessel registration would continue to serve the stated
important goal of national uniformity, since like all copyright
registration, it is federally based and requires the appellate review
19
of registration cases by one appellate court, the D.C. Circuit. 3
The bills' common serious shortcoming is that they do not convey
exclusive appellate review to the Federal Circuit.
The new legislation guarantees that many new interpretive
concerns will arise before the courts. Commentators predict that
the rights these bills provide may suffer due to the vagueness of
certain draft definitions. For example, the meaning of several
provisions in the database bill, such as "significant investment,"
are still in doubt. The concerns acknowledge the valuable point
that regardless of Congress' best attempts to clarify legislative
language, in our legal system, interpretative and intercircuit
conflicts are inevitable. These judicial interpretive conflicts may be
so severe that the rights-holders may never find the law effective,
at least as originally intended. Commentators suggest that this
was the critical defect that undermined previous intellectual
property legislation. If this criticism is meritorious, then exclusive
appeals before a unified court also have the benefit of quickly
bringing conflict issues to a head for Congress to address.
An excellent case study for understanding the role of the
federal courts and the nexus between the substance and process in
our legal system is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (Act or
Semiconductor Act). 4 ' It underscores the value of nationwide
uniformity for new forms of intellectual property protection. The
purpose of the Act was to provide protection for the integrated chip
and semiconductor industry. This required establishing a sui
generis form of intellectual property that could address certain
perceived deficiencies in the United States regime, particularly in
copyright law.
The semiconductor industry sought this new form of
protection for two reasons. First, there was severe worldwide chip
piracy. Second, the traditional routes of trade secret, copyright,
and patent law each failed to provide adequate protection for
semiconductor technology.
Trade secret protection proved inadequate for two major
reasons. First, the trade secret laws are not uniform nationwide,
but instead vary from state to state. Second, trade secret law fails
139. H.R. 2696, 105th Cong., 1 Sess., 144 CONG. REC. H1243 (1998).
140. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1991). See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J.
Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: Swamp or Firm
Ground, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 466-67 (1985) (discussing the advantages of

the Semiconductor Act which include the various benefits and protections
regarding copyright law).

1999]

Federal Circuit'sForgotten Lessons?

to protect against reverse engineering and honest discovery by a
second designer.'
Copyright
law
provides
inadequate
protection
for
semiconductor technology as well. Copyright law constitutionally
requires a certain level of originality lacking in many utilitarian
designs, and in any event does not protect useful articles.'42
Semiconductor circuit mask works thus failed to meet the
necessary standards to merit copyright protection.'
Failing this
standard, the U.S. Copyright Office refused to register the circuit
masks. 44 Registration is a key aspect of a work's copyright
protection since it is necessary for effective legal remedies such as
statutory damages and attorney's fees. 4'
Patent law also failed to provide adequate protection for the
semiconductor industry at the time. The nature of the chip
technology did not always satisfy the requirements for patent
protection.146 While the Supreme Court upheld the broad scope of
patent protection so that one may patent "anything under the
sun,"147 it is still necessary to meet the statutory criteria. 14 An
141. See Smith v. Snap-on Tools, Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987)
(upholding common law protection for trade secrets). See also Risberg, supra
note 114, at 253-54 (discussing how trade secret law does not protect against a
variety of disclosure attempts).
142. Risberg, supra note 114, at 252-54.
Further, U.S. copyright law
prohibits registration of "useful articles" as pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works. Id. The proposal to expand the scope of the subject matter of copyright
to include utilitarian articles was considered and then rejected by Congress as
the Act was being drafted.
Steven P. Kasch, The Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act: Past, Present, and Future, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 71, 84 (1992)
(citing H.R. 1028 Hearings: Copyright Protection for Semiconductor Chips:
Hearings on H.R. 1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 88 (1983)). Emory Law Professor L. Ray Patterson recognized "that
copyright had historically inured to the benefit of publishers. This conceptual
weakness between form and function. . . would be further eroded if explicitly
utilitarian articles, such as mask works, were to become copyrightable subject
matter." Id.
143. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprintedin 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5708.
144. John G. Rauch, The Realities of Our Times: The Semiconductor Chip
ProtectionAct of 1984 and the Evolution of the Semiconductor Industry, 75 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 93, 98 (1993).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1998). See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading,
Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that statutory damages may
be provided, including attorney's fees, even if there is no proof of actual
damages).
146. At the Senate hearings, Professor Arthur Miller testified, "[tihe [low]
level of creativity involved in [chip] layout designs does not usually rise to the
level required by the patent laws." Risberg, supra note 114, at 251.
147. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (quotations supplied
by author).
148. The statutory criteria for a patent include utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1998), respectively.
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applicant must also pursue the expense and burden of the PTO
application process. The bureaucracy of the PTO application
process may be so severe and slow that it acts as a disincentive to
seeking patent protection. 9 For the purposes of this Article, the
most interesting complaint of the patent system at the time of the
Act's consideration was the uncertainty in the law arising from the
federal regional courts of appeals.
The federal courts, before Congress established the Federal
Circuit, were blamed for undermining patent protection in a
variety of ways.' 50 It was suggested that "some courts were openly
hostile to patent 'monopolies. '""' As discussed earlier in this
Article, a major problem with patents arose from the lack of
uniformity in patent law due to the widespread disparate
treatment among the various regional federal courts of appeals. 52
Today, the semiconductor industry is one of the nation's most
successful sectors, and computers proliferate our lives, but the
Semiconductor Act is not considered a major source of protection
for the industry. Evidence for this result may be inferred from two
places. First, other critics cite the few annual registrations of
mask works".3 at the U.S. Copyright Office as evidence of the
industry's lack of reliance on the Act."' Second, the absence of any
but a handful of federal court cases on this subject is considered as
proof of the Act's shortcomings. 5'
Washington attorney Michael J. Remington, the former
House Judiciary Subcommittee Chief Intellectual Property
Counsel who worked on the Act's enactment, argues two points in
its defense."' First, successful statutes do not breed litigation."7
Second, the Act has made the United States a world leader, since
149. Cf. Risberg, supra note 114, at 265. The "industry's true aim may have
been to acquire a new form of protection that involved neither a timeconsuming search through prior art nor design disclosure.

.

.

. One common

but misguided complaint about patent protection is that it takes too long to
acquire." Id.
150. "Today's improved climate for patent protection is directly attributable

to the creation of the Federal Circuit." Id. at 268.
151. Id. at 263-64.
152. Id. at 263.
153. A mask work is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (1998). See supra note
10 and accompanying text.

154. The U.S. Copyright Office, Visual Arts Section division reports that it
registers less than 1000 mask works each year from firms worldwide.
Telephone Interview with U.S. Copyright Office, Visual Arts Section. The
world's largest chip company, Intel, registered no mask works in 1998. Id.
155. Two such cases include Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
156. Telephone Interview with Attorney Michael J. Remington, former
House Judiciary Subcommittee Chief Intellectual Property Counsel (Nov. 3,

1998).
157. Id.

19991

FederalCircuit's Forgotten Lessons?

legal protection for mask works and chip technology were
incorporated into the GATT-TRIPS agreement that called for such
protection on a global level." 8 Mr. Remington does suggest that
history demonstrates that legislation and technology do not march
hand in hand. 9 He notes that past intellectual property statutes
tied to a specific technology have proved to be not very effective. 6 °
He cites the Digital Audio Recording Act as one example in the
copyright area. 6'
Commentators attribute a variety of factors to explain why
the Semiconductor Act did not prove as successful as originally
envisioned. Business experts conclude that the semiconductor
industry today exists in a very different environment than during
the 1970s and 1980s. Today, the technology in the semiconductor
chip industry has changed.6 ' The product cycles for chips are now
shorter. 13 The industry now produces more semi-customized and
customized chip designs; the industry is more efficient partially
due to innovations such as computer-aided chip design tools.'
These developments in efficiency have in turn reduced the
incentives for copying and piracy.'65
The semiconductor industry changed the way it does business
as well. Industry watchers cite the development of global licensing
agreements among chip firms as another reason that mask
protection is less necessary.'
From a trade perspective, there
have been other important, complementary changes in U.S. law.
The semiconductor industry gained valuable protection from
unfair competition by foreign firms at the U.S. International Trade
Commission,
and
through
the
Omnibus
Trade
and
Competitiveness Act of 1988.167 Finally, the perception of security
arising from a sui generis form of protection may also play a role in
firm reorganization and attracting capital.
The Semiconductor Act is criticized partially because its
standards and tests are considered vague in their meaning.
Another criticism involves the reverse engineering defense. It is
argued that Congress failed to develop "usable legal criteria for

158.
159.
160.
161.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Attorney Michael J. Remington, supra note
See also Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Act of October 28, 1992,

Pub. L. No. 102-563, 196 Stat. 1992.
162. Risberg, supra note 114, at 257. The author argues that the decline in
chip technology is primarily attributable to process technology. Id.

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 269.

167. Risberg, supra note 114, at 268; Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
168. Kasch, supra note 142, at 99, 104-05.
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distinguishing fair from unfair copying. ""'
In other words, the
reverse engineering defense was too broad.
There is no single reason why the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act did not serve to provide the intellectual property
protection for technology as envisioned by its drafters. Yet, its
review provides an informative case study. This case study can
help Congress in its task of creating new, and perfecting existing
intellectual property rights. These rights pose consequences for
investment, international trade and competitiveness, and
innovation. New and old devices will face challenges from evolving
technologies, business relationships, and legal standards. The
Semiconductor Act may have been outmoded by its once less
formidable patent sibling. If this is true, then it occurred because
patents were strengthened by the uniformity arising from the
Federal Circuit's creation and its exclusive appellate review.
Commentators cite the industry's efforts to protect chip
technology through patents strengthened by the "renaissance" in
patent law. This was brought on by the creation of the Federal
Circuit.17 0
The Federal Circuit's annealing of patent law
strengthened the discipline by establishing uniformity and
nationwide standards.
One can safely conclude that the Chip Act would be stronger
if its standards were uniform or if it was not overtaken by patent
law that had its standards unified through a consolidated
nationwide appellate court. The issue of uniformity and standards
seems to be one factor within Congress' control that it should
carefully note. This point highlights a valuable lesson. The
Semiconductor Act might be more useful today if it provided for
appellate review through the Federal Circuit's unified national
jurisdiction. One commentator concluded, "[t]he failure to allocate
jurisdiction over [the Act's] litigation to a single federal appellate
court, such as provided for patent cases, furthers the perception of
unpredictability." 7' This haunting theory is a warning that merits
serious attention.
As this Article discussed earlier, the new economy will
foster economic resource allocation questions and a competition for
investment among a wide array of industrial sectors. The review
of the case histories of specific intellectual property problems
provides useful study. One issue worth further study is the value

169. Id. at 99.
170. See Rauch, supra note 144, at 102 n.48 (stating that the Federal Circuit
revitalized patent law). See also Risberg, supra note 114, at 245 (stating that
"[p]atent law, which has enjoyed a virtual renaissance since creation of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has become more dependable, is
better understood, and is often suitable for the type of chips most likely to
draw imitators.").
171. Risberg, supra note 114, at 263.
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of nationwide legal uniformity and the importance of certain
national legal standards that can only arise through a
consolidated appellate court.
IV. ADVICE REGARDING EXPANDING THE COURT'S JURISDICTION
A national unified court of patent appeals took nearly 200
years to establish, and closed chapters of legal history marked by
uncertainty and confusion. The Federal Circuit proves itself a
successful experiment that invites emulation and expansion. The
benefits of a nationwide appellate court with a consolidated
structure include annealing the law, and with this the court
renders decisions that are better for everyone. Individuals and
firms then may respond accordingly, whether that entails
industrial activity, petitioning Congress, or forbearance.
It is not unprecedented for lawmakers to make policy by
borrowing from other fields. Periodically, Congress, rights-holders
and the bar should review the progress and the state of the new
and old types of intellectual property. They too should consider
expanding the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.'"7 This task is
not radical, but poses many difficulties, including the political,
economic, and juridical.
The first lesson of the Federal Circuit is that an appellate
court of nationwide jurisdiction is desirable. One could easily
argue that all civil litigation could benefit from the uniform
national treatment conferred through a specialized court or a
consolidated court of appeals. In fact, this would be an impractical
modification of federal court jurisdiction today. This lesson is
greater than that the solution to the problem of intercircuit
conflicts is merely consolidating the system into one large circuit.
An intercircuit tribunal could be established to remedy the
The other benefits of a
problems of intercircuit conflicts.
that the court's judges
the
expertise
include
nationwide circuit
develop, and the special recognition of certain nationally
important fields.
The second lesson of the Federal Circuit, however, is one of
economy, or that only certain fields merit such treatment today.

172. See generally COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 72-74

(indicating that the Federal Circuit could take on "additional categories of
cases"). This recent study makes several recommendations concerning the

reorganization of the federal judiciary. The report suggests to Congress the
potential of consolidating tax and social security appeals and conferring these
into the Federal Circuit, but makes no specific recommendations regarding the

jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Id. The Commission members included the
Honorable Byron R. White (chair), N. Lee Cooper, Gilbert Merritt, Pamela
Ann Rymer, and William D. Browning. Id. at app. B. Its Executive Director

was Daniel J. Meador. Id.
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These are fields of law that deserve to be singled out for that
special national treatment because of their significance of
uniformity on domestic innovation, international trade and
competitiveness, investment, and the value of certainty for
litigants. 7
These candidate fields entail primarily morallyneutral economic rights.
Intellectual property and related
industrial property laws meet those criteria. In light of these
lessons, Congress' test includes identifying these worthy candidate
fields for inclusion and then acting accordingly.
This Article does not argue for the wholesale transference of
all copyright, trademark, and semiconductor mask work law to the
Federal Circuit or another consolidated appeals forum.7 1 While
these fields may benefit from such treatment, they also have a
lengthy history and tradition, as did patent law; yet they present
practical and political considerations that are not easily overcome
at this time. In fact, the original legislation creating the Federal
Circuit would have also included all federal trademark law issues
within its appellate jurisdiction. 7 1 Ultimately Congress did not
adopt this due to objections from the trademark bar. The case has
not yet been made to overcome these political and academic
obstacles.
As a practical matter, it may not be of great significance that
the law has not consolidated some appeals into one court of
appeals. 176 For example, the numerous and important copyright
industries, such as film, music and software firms, are located in
the Ninth Circuit. The New York-based publishing industries are
located in the Second Circuit. Some view the Second and the
Ninth Circuits as the de facto consolidated court of copyright
173. Antitrust is another field that seems well-suited for the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. See generally POSNER, supra note 2. While

this Article does not take a position regarding this, it is the case that many
antitrust issues arise before the court due to its pendent jurisdiction especially
involving patent cases.
174. Justice Byron White and his Commission suggested that exclusive
jurisdiction over copyright appeals also be conferred to the Federal Circuit.
COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT 65 (Oct. 1998). It noted that since the

creation of the Federal Circuit in 1981, computers, software patents, and other
"technological developments have wrought far-reaching changes in both
patents and copyrights... [and] brought them together in ways that were
unknown seventeen years ago .... For this reason, some have suggested that

it would be sensible to have patent and copyright claims ultimately
adjudicated in the same court." Id. This suggestion was not adopted in the
December 1998 Final Report. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 3.

The

Final Report did
recommendation.

this

not

offer

an

explanation

for

eliminating

175. H.R. 3806, 96th Cong.
176. Credit for this criticism and observation belongs to attorney Michael J.
Remington.
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appeals while not dejure the case.
Accordingly, there may be other avenues of court reform that
may anneal and improve the law. One radical proposal is to
hybridize the regional courts of appeals by exclusively designating
a specific field to its jurisdiction. This is a "regional-plus court of
For example, Congress could exclusively
appeal" concept.
designate all copyright appeals to the Ninth Circuit. Since the
West database company is based in Minnesota, database appeals
could be consolidated into the Seventh Circuit. Trademark law
could go to the Second Circuit. Finally, in an ironic move,
Congress could transfer vessel hull or admiralty law to a
landlocked circuit such as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. It
is evident that Congress could achieve the many potential benefits
of the Federal Circuit (e.g., uniformity and annealing of the law)
through alternative structural reforms. 7'
This Article contends that Congress is better able to make
these policy choices through study and experimentation. New
forms of intellectual property are excellent test cases to examine
the appellate jurisdiction questions. These are valuable potential
test cases, because they are free of some of the baggage described.
In truth, the Federal Circuit eventually will hear the rare appeal
of these cases originating from the Court of Federal Claims and its
pendent jurisdiction. 7 ' There are many benefits to be gained by
conferring to the Federal Circuit jurisdiction for new forms of
intellectual property on an exclusive basis. These new rights will
get off the launch pad with a brighter future.
The policy decisions regarding the appellate courts'
jurisdiction and the creation of new intellectual property rights
belong to Congress. While raising many tort theories, database
misappropriation and vessel design infringement cases are
examples of excellent test candidates for inclusion. The results of
expanding the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to include new areas
of law are many, and they promise increased uniformity in these
fields, the increased scrutiny of Federal Circuit nominees, easing
burdens on the rest of the federal judiciary, and a more wellrounded and diverse consolidated court.
Recent congressional proposals to expand the Federal
The
Circuit's jurisdiction treat the court with ambivalence.
legislative proposals primarily seek to transfer jurisdiction to the

177. It is noteworthy that as a non-regional court of appeals that the Federal
Circuit has the flexibility to "ride the circuit." COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, supra

note 3, at 72. Thus it travels and hears cases across the nation.
178. H.R. 2652, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1997). Ironically, one of the only

reported Semiconductor Mask work cases was reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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Federal Circuit from another U.S. court of appeals.179 These recent
proposals include the transference of copyright arbitration appeals
currently heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, 8 ° and conferring new jurisdiction to hear appeals from a
proposed U.S. Immigration Court.'
These proposals do not seek the special annealing benefits of
a consolidated court, such as curing the problems among certain
classes of cases that normally are heard across the regional courts
of appeals. These proposed jurisdictional changes are equivalent
to mere "substitutions." The changes do not address the questions
of a concentration of power or decision-making in Washington.
These substitutions between the two appellate courts cannot
increase or decrease uniformity within their fields. This action
does seem to imply that some members in Congress believe that
the Federal Circuit has greater expertise or competence in some
matters than its sister appellate court, the D.C. Circuit.
Congress is unlikely to create a new consolidated appellate
court soon. If Congress looks to expand the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction, it is well-advised to take into account the following
recommendations when reviewing any additional jurisdiction for
the court:
1. Congress should first be skeptical of any recommended
subject-matterfor the expanded jurisdiction.While uniformity
is important, only certain fields present the special needs or
qualifications that merit or can justify national treatment
within our current system. Academic literature chronicles
that industries exaggerate their alleged problems. 8' The
groups that are best represented before Congress may not be
representative of any industry as a whole or the public
interest at large;
2. Any modifications in the court's jurisdiction should be
incremental and slow.

8

The United States represents one of

179. There are additionally proposals to expand the core jurisdiction of the
court, such as its taking cases. S. 1256, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
180. The Copyright Compulsory License Improvement Act, S. 1720, 105th

Cong. § 7 (1998); The Copyright Compulsory License Improvement Act, H.R.

3210, 105th Cong. § 7 (1998). Current law provides that the appeals are
reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 17 U.S.C. § 802(g)
(1998); Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976).
181. H.R. 4107, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). Currently such Immigration

and Naturalization Service cases are appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
182. See Risberg, supra note 114, at 276 (indicating that
semiconductor industry exaggerated the chip piracy problem
technologically naive Congress").

"[tihe
to a

183. This common-sense theme can be found in previous court reform
literature.

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra

note 77, at 13.
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the largest intellectual property marketplaces and home to
creators in the world. Any changes to our system, especially
those of a rapid or unexpected nature, can have global
financial and research ramifications that need to be carefully
assessed;
3. Congress should be courageous. It is often the case that
the intellectual property issues that Congress faces are
politically difficult, technically complex and involve
financially important and well-represented sectors of the
economy;" and finally but certainly not least,
4. Congress must be extremely careful not to overburden the
Federal Circuit. In a relatively short time period, the Court
has become a very successful institution that has achieved
great success in perfecting certain areas of national law,
particularly in dealing with the extremely factual
complexities of patent law. It is all too easy to foil the
workings of the Federal Circuit by overburdening it with
excessive or improperly characterized jurisdiction.
M

Expanding the Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
include the proposed new forms of intellectual property, such as
vessel hull designs or the compilations of information, meets all
four of these criteria.
The creation of an intellectual property court without good
reason seems to be a vain thing. Yet, the compelling benefits of
this new jurisdiction promise it will follow the very successful
tradition that the patent law renaissance embodies. The risks of
intercircuit conflicts and forum shopping threaten to make new
rights ineffective as envisioned.
Legislation providing such
jurisdiction even temporarily as the exclusive forum for these
appeals, such as sunsetting after a trial period of ten years for
example, would yield important benefits. A narrowly tailored
proposal conferring unified appellate jurisdiction is a clever
compromise of past proposals. It would also help these new fields
of law evolve uniformly, provide certainty for all parties (e.g.,
business firms, litigants, and users), strengthen our industrial
base, improve our trade and competitiveness, and promote
innovation. Finally, it will enlighten our understanding of the
time-proven and valuable consolidated appellate court system, and
with this, of the Federal Circuit.

184. See id. at 5 (noting pressure from "vested interests and pressure
groups").
"Congress deserves praise for having the courage to tackle
semiconductor legislation." Kasch, supra note 142, at 99. See also Chris J.

Katopis, Patients v. Patents? Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legislation,
71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1997) (describing the political and ethical
difficulties surrounding medical patent legislation).
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CONCLUSION

The great lesson of the Federal Circuit is that for certain legal
fields a consolidated national appeals forum provides many
jurisprudential advantages over a system of regional courts of
appeals while at an acceptable cost. One notable advantage of
such a court is the annealing or the greater uniformity of the law
within its jurisdiction. This ensures that legal and economic
resources are better allocated due to the greater legal certainty for
individual and societal decision-making. The best evidence of this
development is the court's renaissance of patent law, and thus the
enhancement of progress' incentives and fruits. Jurisdictional
procedures fundamentally affect the law by shaping its substance.
In intellectual property, and the balance of the law, this can
guarantee strong rights and effective remedies.
The fundamental bargain embodied by all intellectual
property law is the exchange of a private incentive for the public
good. Greater uniformity in the law protects and enhances the
incentives for the creation and authorship to enrich the public that
the Framers envisioned and enshrined in the Constitution.
Congress' careful crafting of laws in this area is not its obligation,
but certainly helps to secure that purpose. Our intellectual
property system may be enhanced in a variety of ways to make it
understandable, uniform, reliable and consistent.
Specially
tailoring court jurisdiction is a simple and proven enhancement. A
Federal Circuit jurist said it best, "[t]he Federal Circuit alone may
not provide us with all of the answers, but it provides us with an
available case study from which at least preliminary lessons can
be learned."' While Congress hesitates to build on the success of
the Federal Circuit, it must not ignore the opportunity to
thoroughly explore its lessons. The strong public interest in
advancing progress in the arts and sciences, and stimulating the
marketplace demands that the valuable lessons the Federal
Circuit teaches us are not lost.

185. Plager, supra note 78, at 867.

